Abstract. A research on the development of a new public-key encryption scheme based on matrix diagonalization problem over a ring of algebraic integers is reported in this paper. The research is original, although it is still in its early stage. The new public key encryption algorithm has three original features that distinguish it from existing ones: (a) it works on an infinite field instead of a Galois field; (b)it recognizes the ability of adversaries to factor big integers; (c) it requires only simple (without modulus) additions and multiplications for message encryption and decryption, no high-order exponentiation is required.
Introduction
The idea of inventing new public key cryptographies by exploring the matrix diagonalization problem (MDP) was first suggested in [1] . The original encryption system was implemented with modulo-p addition and multiplications, where p is a big prime, which was broken due to the fact that the characteristic polynomial of the public key matrix can be factored efficiently over GF(p) using Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm [2] . Improved public key encryption and digital signature schemes were developed later with the same idea, but with the underlying algebraic setting selected differently as Zn, the ring of integers with modulo-n addition and multiplication, where n is an RSA modulus [3] [4] . The new selection links MDP to integer factorization problem (IFP). In fact, diagonalizing a 2×2 matrix over Zn is equivalent to solving a modulo-n quadratic equation, or inverting the Rabin public key function [5] , which is a proven hard problem.
The purpose of this paper is to report the further research on developing an encryption scheme based on MDP over yet another algebraic setting, which is an infinite field instead of a Galois field, as is the case with almost all existing schemes. Since factoring a polynomial over the specially formulated algebraic setting is a brand new crypto problem, the complexity of which is still under study. However, we have made important progress on this aspect, which will be presented in this paper.
The new encryption scheme

The algebraic setting
First, we choose a big composite integer, denoted n, which is a product of a large number of primes. Let p and q be two secret divisors of n, pq=n, a ring of algebraic integers, denoted Ω, can be defined as
s is an integer, s is an irrational number, Z stands for the ring of integers,
Another algebraic setting, denoted Π, can be defined with Ω, 
, and
gives the inverse of There are 168 primes between 1 and 1000[6], we suggest that n be selected as 150 primes among them, so that , the size of which will be comparable with that of widely used RSA modulus [7] . 1500 450 150 2 10 ) 1000
The keys
The private key for the encryption scheme is given by (8) Note that the private key can be represented by (λ 1 , λ 2 ,…λ r ) , while the public key can be represented by (σ 1 , σ 2 , …σ r ).
The trap-door one-way function
The following trap-door one-way function is used for message encryption in this paper: (9) where is an r×1 matrix, the elements of which can be computed as , so that
Message encryption
The encrypting process is divided into the following three steps
Step 1 Create r random numbers in Ω. These numbers, denoted , can be computed from the public key as where m is the message, 2 ψ is a publicly known one-way function similar to 1 ψ .
The full cipher text of m is given by (y, z).
Message decryption
One notices that ( 
Security of the encryption scheme
We study in this section two kinds of possible attacks on our encryption scheme. The first kind of attacks aims at recovering the secret key, while the second kind of attacks tries to crack the cipher texts. 
Attacks aiming at recovering the private key
over Π. Since Π is an infinite field, the polynomial factoring algorithms that work well on Galois fields, such as the famous Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm, will not work on it. According to Abel's theorem [9] , it is also hard for the adversary to solve φ(λ)=0 over R, the real number field, as this task is incapable of finite number of additions, multiplications and root extractions if r>4.
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However, it is easily verified that (21) can not be broken into a small number of rational equations over Z, so this transformation can not reduce the complexity of recovering the private key. 42  41  32  31  22  21  12  11 , , , , , , , ω ω ω ω α α α α over Z. This transformation makes it possible to recover the private key with existing polynomial factorization algorithms over finite fields. However p and q, the factors of n, should be found before the above method can be applied, and for this purpose we can not find any existing method that is more effective than enumeration. Suppose n is selected as a product of 150 different primes, and p is selected as the product of 70 prime factors of n, it takes maximal tries for the adversary to find p. We have , which is more than the number of all 128-bits symmetric keys.
Attacks aiming at cracking the cipher texts
We have studies three methods that may be used to solve (20). These methods may also be used to solve (13), in order to crack the cipher text directly. Complexity of applying the second and the third methods to (13) is the same as that of applying it to However we have not been able to reduce the cryptographic problem formulated in this paper to either of the proven hard problems mentioned above. The security topics that remained open to further research includes the complexity of reducing (13) to quartic or lower order univariate equations through nonlinear transformations and the complexity of solving (13) over R without breaking it into univariate equations.
